SINDHI THINKERS FORUM INTERNATIONAL

Kalabagh Dam -- Development or disaster?

For the past so many years of its planning and designing, the objectives and goals of Kalabagh Dam (KBD) have been shrouded in secrecy, and the Federal Government’s blind following of the project, against the wishes of the three provinces of the federation, has made it the most controversial issue of national integrity.
The project is being pleaded as a turning point in the direction of national development, whereas the provinces see it as step towards the diversion of common resources towards the development of one province (Punjab), leaving all the rest to the possible negative impacts perceived from the project.
The matter becomes more complex in the present state of better possible alternatives, having greater development potentials and lesser negative impacts on any of the federating units of Pakistan.
One of the reasons for creating controversy and difference of opinion on the project is attributed to WAPDA’s failure to adequately consult the provinces at the project planning and design stage, since the provinces were kept in complete darkness about the design parameters of the dam, till the completion of its detailed design in 1984-85.
To further fuel the issue, statements from responsible officials of the federal government, the Punjab and WAPDA, first declared Kalabagh Dam as only a storage dam to offset the storage loss of Tarbela and Mangla Dams, due to sedimentation. Followed by reasons of rise in fuel costs and the consequent increased costs due to thermal generation, pleading the ultimate requirement of cheap hydel power. And, to further confuse the issue, the project was declared to have plans for a Left and Right Bank canals for irrigation purposes.
In the backdrop of all these events, the role of beneficiaries/affectees has been totally ignored. For which, they have every right to ask for the public disclosure of all the relevant facts regarding selection criteria, planning parameters, design guidelines, cost estimates, environmental and socio-economic assessments, government’s priorities, and financing mechanism of the planned construction. And it becomes more important for projects towards the harnessing of shared water resources, like that of River Indus, and for the equitable distribution of their benefits among the federating units as well as their short and long term impacts on their individual as well as collective lives.

Brief Introduction of Kalabagh Dam Project
The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) is proposed to be located on the River Indus at about 120 miles downstream of Tarbela Dam, 92 miles downstream the confluence of Kabul and Indus Rivers and 16 miles upstream of the existing Jinnah Barrage. The site is a narrow and deep channel extending over 5-mile distance where the river is about 1,300 feet wide.
According to the PC-II of the Project "KBD was initiated by GOP in 1953, and until 1973, the project was basically considered as a storage project for meeting the irrigation needs, and consequently, rapid increases in the cost of energy have greatly enhanced the priority of KBD as a power project".
The project planning report, circulated in March 84, tried to establish the technical and economic feasibility of the project, and the detailed designs/tender documents, commenced in March 84, and was completed by December 1985.
The feasibility study and documentation have cost the GOP around one billion rupees so far.
According to one of WAPDA’s latest briefs on the KBD Project, the dam and its objectives are described in the following words:
"It is expected to be a 260 ft high structure and would create reservoir 6.1 million acres feet (MAF) of usable storage. The annual generation of energy would amount to about 11,200 GWh, generated by hydro power plant of 2400 MW capacity. This capacity may ultimately be increased to 3600 MW, making KBD one of the largest hydro generation dams in Asia. The total project cost covering civil and power facilities, as estimated by the consultants at June 1987 prices, will be about US $ 5.153 billion, including the cost of interest during construction, customs duties, taxes and price contingencies"
(Note: At the present day’s construction costs, the dam is expected to cost around US $ 8 billion)
Another WAPDA release "WAPDA Projects in Brief" of January 1986, describes the project as: "Kalabagh Dam is a multipurpose project to be built across the River Indus. Basically; it is a power project which aims at accelerating the tempo of economic development in Pakistan".
Briefly, in WAPDA’s terms, the proposed KBD has the following aims:
To generate large amounts of low cost hydro electric power near major load centers, and supply the existing grid for meeting the growing power demand of agriculture, industrial and domestic consumers. In addition, it will increase the energy output of the existing Tarbela scheme by permitting the conjunctive operation of the two reservoirs.
To provide additional storage on the Indus River, and thus reduce the exiting system shortfalls in irrigation requirements.
To provide additional regulation on the River Indus, and thus provide better system control and management for supplying assured, adequate and timely irrigation water for crops.
To compensate for the storage loss due to the silting up of exiting reservoirs till such time that their substitutes, (presently planned) are actually available.
To eliminate and control the flood peaks in the River Indus so as to minimize flood hazards downstream.
To increase Pakistan’s capability to manage its water distribution and power generation systems through the conjunctive operation of Tarbela and KBD reservoir
It is believed by WAPDA that "the conjunctive operation of Kalabagh Dam will enhance Tarbela’s generation capacity to 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of peaking power. Which will increase the share of hydel power on the national grid, thus controlling the overall cost of power generation, along with the reduction in thermal generation to result in savings in fuel import"?
Distinctive Characteristics of KBD Project (Ref: WAPDA Reports)
The project has two spillways on the Right Bank for the disposal of floodwater, having a total maximum discharge capacity of 2 million cusecs.
On the left bank is the powerhouse, which is connected to 12 tunnel conduits, each 36 ft in diameter, with ultimate power generation capacity of 3600 MW.
The KBD reservoir will extend 92 miles up the Indus from the dam site and 36 miles up the Soan River, and about 10 miles up the Kabul River from the Kabul-Indus confluence, at its normal retention level, at which the reservoir area would be 164 sq. miles in total.
The total cultivable affected land under the reservoir, according to WAPDA’s figures, will be 35000 acres, out of which 27500 acres falls under the reservoir and will be permanently acquired (24500 acres in Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP); while the floods (of recurrence interval of 1 in 5 yrs) will temporarily submerge 7500 acres of land (6000 acres in Punjab and 1500 acres in NWFP). The land will be taken on easement, under which the title of the land will remain with the owners and it will be available for cultivation during normal season flows.
According to WAPDA, the operation schedule will allow the reservoir to be emptied unto the 890-ft above MSL once every year, and will allow one season cropping in about 14000 acres of land, lying above that level.According to them, out of the whole-submerged land under the reservoir, the total irrigated land is 3000 acres (2900 acres in Punjab and 100 acres in NWFP).
As per the 1991 WAPDA estimates, the total population displaced by the KBD will be 83000 (48500 will be from Punjab and 34500 will be from NWFP).
To compensate the dam displaced people; WAPDA has a plan to offer a minimum of 12.5 acres land as land compensation per land-owning family, for which 74000 acres of irrigated land will be required.
To efficiently clear the deposited sediment from the reservoir, the dam is proposed to have an orifice spillway having its crest level 40-ft below the minimum elevation 835-ft level.
It is believed by WAPDA’s experts that the operational rules specifying the retention of reservoir at the minimum level of El.825-ft above MSL in the month of June and up to 20th July, will enable direct sluicing of the silt laden early floods, as well as averting the risks of flooding in the upstream areas of the reservoir.
Salient Features of KBD Project
1
The Main Reservoir of the Dam

Total Storage
7.9 MAF (9,750 million cu m)

Usable Storage
Dead Storage
6.1 MAF (7,550 million cu m)
1.8 MAF( 2,200 million cu m)

Retention Level
El.915-ft above MSL (278.9 m)

Min Reservoir Level
El.825-ft above MSL (251.5 m)

Area at Retention Level
105,000 acres ; (164 sq.m=425 sq. km)
3
Main Dam

Crest Elevation
Crest Width
El. 940-ft above MSL (286.5 m)
50 ft (15.2 m)

Max Height
260 ft (79.2)

Length
Length (overall)
4375 ft
11000 ft 3350 m)
4
Catchments Area of the Dam
110,500 sq. miles
5
Fill Volume
Main + Closure Embankments
Intake Embankments
Right Auxiliary Embankments
Guide Bunds, Cofferdams etc

million cu m
5.9 million cu m
million cu. m
10.5 million cu m
6.
Overflow Spillway

Sill Level
El. 860-ft above MSL (262.1 m)

No and size of radial gates
PMF Discharge
10 No. 50ft (15.2 m ) w x 55 ft (16.8m )
0.98 million cusecs (1.07 million cusecs)

7.
Project Cost

Based on Cost at June 1987
US $ 2.65 billion

Present Estimated Cost
US $ 8-10 billion

8.
Orifice Spillway

Sill level
No and size of radial gates
785 ft (239.3m) SPD
10 No. 38 ft (11.6 m) w x 22 ft

9.

10.
Convertible conduits
No & Size of Conduits
Average Length
Lining

No & Size of gates
Upstream bulkhead
Upstream radial
Downstream radial

4-36 ft (11 m) diameter
940 ft (286.5 m)
Steel with concrete encasement

1-36 ft (11 m) w x 36 ft (11m)
4-36 ft (11 m) w x 36 ft (11m)
2-35 ft (10.7m) w x 36 ft (11m)

11.
Power Facilities
No and size of intake gates
Upstream bulkhead
Upstream radial

2-36 ft (11m) w x 36 ft (11m)
8-36 ft (11m) w x 36 ft (11m)
12.
Penstocks
Size and average length
Lining

36 ft (11m) diameter, 850 ft
Steel with concrete encasement

13
Power Station
Type
No. of Units
Installed Capacity
Turbines, design head
Generators, nominal/maximum rating

Indoor
8 (initial); 12 (ultimate)
2400 MW (initial); 3600 MW (ultimate)
Francis Type, 170 ft (51.8m)
13.1
Irrigation Benefits
Increase in future annual irrigation supplies (Average)

4.5 MAF (5.500 million Cum)
13.2

13.3
Energy generation
At KBD
Extra at Tarbela
Total

Power Available (initial eight units)
Max Power
Dependable Power

11413 million kWh
236 million kWh
11749 kWh

2776 MW
1463 MW
References:
Rashed A. Saeed, KBD Project; A Scientific Analysis, Print Associates Int’l Islamabad, 1995
Kazi Abrar, KBD The Sindh Case, Creative Communications, Hyderabad, 1998

Expected Benefits of the KBD Project
The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) has been pleaded by WAPDA as the only possible choice for saving the food and energy starved nation of Pakistan. In this respect, it has worked out the following beneficial aspects of the project:
Enhancement in the Irrigation Water Supply
The dam is designed to have a left bank canal, off-taking from the left bank high level outlet works of KBD. It will have a capacity of 15,000 cusecs, will be 170 miles long, and will lift about 6.65 MAF water annually from the Kalabagh Dam reservoir.Through this canal, the province of Punjab wishes to irrigate its 371,000 acres of land, on both the banks, of Mianwali, Khushab and Jehlum Districts.
To meet the irrigation water requirements, the canal is planned to provide 0.78 MAF in Rabi and 1.23 MAF in Kharif to the new cultivated area, and will discharge the balance 4.64 MAF water into Jehlum at Rasul Barrage to meet shortage of Mangla command, thus fulfilling water shortages in the Mangla command.
Another canal was proposed on the Right Bank of the dam, to irrigate certain areas of NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa), but it has been discarded now, because WAPDA considers it unfeasible.
Enhancement in the Power Generation Capacity
The KBD is expected to have 8 units of 300 MW capacities initially, which will be ultimately increased to 12 units of 300 MW capacities. The power expected to be generated out of the KBD is as under:
Capacity (MW)
Generation (GWH)
2400
11413
2800
13216
3200
15103
3600
16990

It is further believed by WAPDA that KBD will generate 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of peaking power by working in conjunction with Tarbela.
(Reference: WAPDA Brief to Senate Standing Committee on Water and Power, November 1997)

A Critical Analysis of the KBD Project
A lot has been said, and is still being said, both in favor and against the KBD project, and the debate will continue till a final decision on its fate is achieved.
In this respect, the Federal Government & WAPDA, having all the administrative machinery at their disposal, have conducted a number of studies and organized various seminars, for projecting the beneficial aspects of the project and allay fears against its negative impacts. On the other hand, enlightened professionals and nationalist organizations have, both individually and collectively, researched on the subject and tried to expose the over-shadowed negative aspects of KBD.
Whereas the few benefits of KBD project have been extensively propagated through the wide publicity campaigns of WAPDA, there has been a need to compile the findings of those unknown researchers, who burnt their midnight oil to expose the multiple destructive capacities of Kalabagh Dam.
Building upon the work done by the said researchers, the following pages will present a critical analysis of the KBD project, so as to enable the reader to assess for himself/herself the ultimate utility of the project to Pakistan.
General Observations on KBD Project
KBD is the only major project in the history of Pakistan, which has been most strongly opposed by the three, out of the four, provinces for various reasons. In this respect, unanimous resolutions have been passed by their elected Provincial Assembles to reject the viability of the project. Also, in the National Assembly and the Senate, the project has been strongly opposed by the elected representatives.
Apart from the technical flaws, making the construction and operation of the project an ultimate disaster, the people of the three provinces have certain reservations against its viability for the integrity of the country, and their common development.
Some of these reservations are described below:
Reservations of NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa)
NWFP objects to the KBD because, a sizable number of its people will be displaced, and a vast area of its land will either be submerged under the reservoir or rendered waterlogged.
In the original design of KBD, the reservoir elevation was desired at 925-ft above MSL, at which the water level in River Kabul was feared to rise by 2.5-ft at Nowshera, immediately after construction and to the ultimate 9.5-ft after 30 years of the project implementation.
To account for this, and as protection against damages in these areas, WAPDA had proposed to erect 25-ft high dykes around the Kabul River, so as to protect the cities from the water’s spillover.
However, due to the high risk factor for the flooding eventuality and subsequent drainage problems, the Government of NWFP seriously objected the designs of the project and conducted investigations in 1985 to assess the possible impacts of KBD on the Peshawar valley.
As a result, it was revealed that, at the 925-ft reservoir elevation, the following major impacts were expected to occur:
60000 acres of area will be affected by the 1 in 5 year floods
16 number unprotected villages will be required to be acquired and their population resettled
64933 persons will require resettlement elsewhere.
Another 131000 persons will be requiring protection through 24 feet high dykes
A total of 28 miles long flood protection dykes will be constructed along the Kabul River, out of which 18 miles length will be specifically required to protect the Nowshera town alone.
The dykes retained water was feared to contribute to the overall rise in water table in the immediate vicinity of the reservoir.
In addition, the following facilities were feared to be permanently submerged in the reservoir in a 1 in 100 year flood, and therefore required relocation: i. 20.45 km of National Highway, 2 km Nowshera-Mardan road,
ii. 10 km Nizampur Attock road, 25 km Pir Sabak-Jehangira roadv. 6.92-km Railway line between Khairabad - Nowsheravi. 5.43 km railway line between Nowshera - Mardanvii. Bridge at Khushab Gardhviii. Khairabad Bridge at Attock required strengthening and modificationsix. Jehangira Bridge required rising by 15 ftx. Nowshera Railway Bridge required rising by 6-ftxi. Nowshera Mardan Bridge required rising by 6-ftxi. Telecommunication, power lines and gas lines also required relocation
In the light of these findings, the Government of NWFP requested WAPDA to revise the project.
Lately, WAPDA has revised the designs and reduced the reservoir elevation to 915-ft above MSL in July 1986. And declared the designs to be safe against all the evils of the previous design.
Whereas, the validity of WAPDA’s statement of a mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir height to solve all the problems is questionable and worth detailed investigation, the people of NWFP doubt the predictions of WAPDA’s experts due to their previously ill-conceived designs of KBD, and hold strong apprehensions against the real objectives of the project.

They, therefore, still believe that:
The dam will raise the water level of River Indus throughout the Attock gorge, right through the Haro river confluence and up to the Akora Khattak on Kabul River. And resultantly, the Nowshera City, inhibited by 200,000 people falling on both the left and right banks of Kabul River, will be under severe threat of flooding. And in the long term of about 50 years time, the Nowshera City and its adjoining areas will become waterlogged swamplands, due to the seepage from the raised water level.
The Mardan and Swabi SCARP projects, covering 123,000 acres of irrigated land, will face certain threat of failure, because of their outfalls being lower than the high flood levels in KBD reservoir.
WAPDA has prepared a water release pattern of the post KBD irrigation supplies, which will have an adverse impact on the CRBC project, as it does not provide enough water for undertaking the lift components of CRBC in future. Similarly, the CRBC is also likely to be affected for long periods during the construction of the project and during the first pending of the reservoir
Therefore, in the absence of an independent assessment of the damages at the 915-ft reservoir level, and with no-trust in WAPDA’s claims of all-well, the people of NWFP take the previously arrived figures of social and economic costs as an eye opener on the viability of the project.
People still believe that the mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir level will have a negligible mitigating impact in taking care of the colossal injury to NWFP.
A detailed discussion on the various dimensions of the project follows later.

Reservations of Baluchistan
The largest province of Pakistan, Baluchistan, does not touch River Indus and is not a riparian in the strictest sense. Still the Pat Feeder canal from Guddu Barrage, with 3400 cusecs of water, irrigates about 300,000 acres in the province. And with a recent request of Baluchistan Government to remodel the Pat Feeder canal, the flow is further expected to be increased to 6000 cusecs, irrigating a further 200,000 acres.
Baluchistan’s opposition to KBD is therefore based on its apprehension that future requests for more water from River Indus will meet little success if KBD over stretches the demand of water in Indus River system.
In addition, with the revised distribution of water in the post KBD scenario, Baluchistan fears a further reduction in its share of irrigation water usage, which is already very low.
Reservations of Sindh
Sindhi´s believe that KBD left bank canal will divert the waters of Indus to Rasul-Qadirabad sector in the upper reaches of Punjab, and the whole of River Indus waters will be left to cater to the needs of Punjab only, whenever their is shortage of water in Jehlum, or in the eventuality of India appropriating all the waters of Jehlum, or Chenab or both
Sindh, which is a lower riparian of River Indus, has constantly felt threatened by Punjab and has bitterly disputed the figures of water availability advanced by WAPDA, citing legal, economic, ecological, geomorphologic and many other reasons for opposing KBD.
From the past experience of the operation of Taunsa-Punjnad and Chashma-Jehlum canal, people in Sindh perceive that Punjab plans to allow the civil works or the canal system to be constructed as projects of national survival and run the surplus water for a few years to establish precedence and develop water users, who will then apply pressure to keep the water supply running. Later, when the water rights are well established in Punjab, they can force the lower riparian (or don’t even ask) to accept the fait accompli and keep the water supply running since the tap is in the hands of the upper riparian.
Therefore, Sindh’s strongly opposes the construction of KBD.

Basic Planning Drawbacks in KBD Project
The KBD project suffers from a multitude of planning and design drawbacks, which makes it the least desired development alternative, out of the various development opportunities available in the Indus Basin.
With the KBD as a test case, the following paragraphs exposes the planning capability of WAPDA and the intelligence level of the decision makers at the top, who are adamant to support and propagate the case of a technically unfeasible dam on River Indus.
Unavailability of Enough Water in the Indus River System
The amount of water flowing through the River Indus has been a point of acute disagreement between the planners of KBD project and other impartial engineers.
To technically analyze the issue, the following table, from the year 1922 to 1991, indicates 69 years maximum flow pattern of the western rivers of Pakistan, measured at rim stations (Indus at KBD, Jehlum at Mangla & Chenab at Marala)

Seasonal and Annual Flows in Western Rivers (MAF)
Years
Kharif Flow
Rabi
Total Flows
1922-23
121.48
25.96
147.44
1923.24
130.41
23.55
154.01
1924-25
109.51
20.13
129.69
1925-26
100.51
18.22
118.73
1926-27
99.16
18.15
117.31
1927-28
90.42
20.41
110.83
1928-29
108.22
22.09
130.31
1929-30
97.20
26.94
124.14
1930-31
117.13
19.73
136.86
1931-32
101.10
22.30
123.40
1932-33
107.62
17.64
125.26
1933-34
125.68
18.77
144.44
1934-35
108.19
18.67
126.86
1935-36
116.81
22.28
139.09
1936-37
124.91
20.91
145.82
1937-38
110.10
21.34
131.44
1938-39
125.36
22.59
147.95
1939-40
127.24
17.54
144.78
1940-41
107.52
15.58
120.10
1941-42
107.75
25.92
133.67
1942-43
143.57
23.51
167.08
1943-44
127.39
19.61
147.00
1944-45
116.08
20.10
136.16
1945-46
131.64
18.86
150.50
1946-47
110.44
18.42
128.86
1947-48
101.36
23.31
124.69
1948-49
132.15
23.57
155.72
1949-50
132.29
23.71
156.00
1950-51
151.28
20.38
171.66
1951-52
93.60
20.21
113.81
1952-53
112.33
17.97
130.30
1953-54
116.31
26.77
143.08
1954-55
119.98
20.27
140.25
1955-56
107.51
25.02
132.53
1956-57
131.92
25.46
157.38
1957-58
123.0
28.10
151.10
1958-59
124.47
34.09
158.56
1959-60
154.74
32.05
186.79
1960-61
124.97
20.74
145.71
1961-62
119.58
20.93
140.51
1962-63
89.96
19.85
109.81
1963-64
113.40
21.66
135.06
1964-65
116.11
22.32
138.43
1965-66
117.81
21.09
138.98
1966-67
116.84
23.83
140.47
1967-68
120.43
25.76
146.19
1968-69
115.63
23.21
138.85
1969-70
114.49
19.77
134.26
1970-71
90.27
15.90
106.17
1971-72
88.40
15.74
104.14
1972-73
101.62
24.45
126.09
1973-74
144.97
19.12
164.09
1974-75
79.47
18.27
97.74
1975-76
116.30
23.22
139.52
1976-77
116.86
18.43
135.28
1977-78
104.36
23.10
127.46
1978-79
137.45
26.03
163.47
1979-80
108.84
23.14
131.98
1980-81
109.81
26.58
136.39
1981-82
117.69
22.93
140.62
1982-83
97.10
25.27
122.38
1983-84
128.28
21.67
149.96
1984-85
115.99
18.93
134.92
1985-86
91.66
26.04
117.70
1986-87
116.38
30.27
146.67
1987-88
111.79
29.28
141.07
1988-89
136.56
24.84
101.42
1989-90
102.01
29.31
131.31
1990-91
130.97
35.14
166.12
1991-92
141.53
30.57
172.10
1992-93
138.62
31.06
169.68
1993-94
104.67
22.80
127.47
Mean
115.24
22.03
137.27
Median
116.20
21.66
137.64
Maximum
154.74
(1959-60)
35.09
(1958-59)
186.79
(1959-60)
Reference: Surface Water Availability for Further Development, WAPDA, December 1994
From the table five parameters are evident
I. Maximum flow of the 3 western rivers 186.79 MAF evidenced in 1959-60
ii. Minimum flow of the 3 western rivers 100.31 MAF evidenced in 1974-75
iii. Average (per year) flow of the 3 western is 137.27 MAF
iv. 4 out 5 years flow of 3 western rivers is 123.59 MAF
A closer analysis of the flow pattern reveals that super floods occur approximately once in 5 years time, which may jack up the average flow to the respectable 137.27 MAF per year, but in the remaining four years, availability of water remain around 123.59 MAF only, or lower.
In all its calculations of the availability of water for KBD, WAPDA has insisted upon the average flow figures i.e. 137.27 MAF, whereas the criteria for designing a storage dam is of using the 4 out of 5 years flows, giving an 80% probability of water coming down the rivers to enable its storage. By adopting this criteria for our storage reservoirs, we end with a figure of 123.59 MAF available in our Indus River system.
If in the above table of 69 years flow, the 9 years of exceptionally low flows of less than 120.0 MAF are disregarded, the next consecutive 2 years of low flows are 1931-32 (123.59 MAF) and 1932-33 (125.26 MAF), with an average of 124.4 MAF, which is very close to the 123.59 MAF, the figure of 4 out of 5 years water availability (80% probability flow).
To support this theory, the US Supreme Court Ruling is "to be available in a practical sense the supply must be fairly dependable, storage dams cannot be filled on expectations of average flows which do not come, nor on recollections of unusual flows which have passed down the stream in previous year".
Considering the Indus Water Apportionment Accord to be the benchmark, the simple and correct arithmetic of our water resources availability in the Indus River System should read as follows:
Availability of Water in 3 Western Rivers (below rim station) 123.59 MAF
Requirement of the 4 Provinces (according to the Water Accord) 114.35 MAF
Release below Kotri (provisionally agreed in Water Accord) 10.00 MAF
Remainder -0.76 MAF
The negative balance in the calculation shows that, there is virtually not enough water in River Indus, to be stored for usage in later part of any year. And if storage is tried, it will only be at the cost of the downstream riparian, depriving them of their legitimate rights of water use.
Contrary to realizing this fact, WAPDA has been publicizing the news of floods in River Indus and its breaching of protective bunds at various places, to try create a perception that enormous quantities of water go "waste" every year, and that if this water was stored in KBD, Pakistan would not only be saved from the damages of these high flows, but its agriculture would take a giant leap towards self-sufficiency. It has been argued that 34.84 MAF of water pass below the Kotri Barrage every year to the sea, and is therefore going waste.
To clarify the misconception of exceptionally high discharges of 34.84 MAF below Kotri, the following points needs to be closely followed:
At present all the barrages and the canals of Pakistan can take about 105 MAF against the allocated 114.35 MAF under the Indus Water Apportionment Accord 1991. The remaining 9.35 MAF ends up on its way to the sea through Kotri. And this will eliminate if the irrigation network is completed to accommodate this additional allocated flow.
Outflow from the eastern rivers of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi into Indus is about 6.97 MAF. Since all three rivers are committed to India, and with the progressive development going on in India, these flows will be reduced to zero (except in the few years of exceptionally high flood season flows), thereby reducing the Kotri discharges by that amount.
As per the Indus Water Treaty, India has also been given an unrestricted use of water to cultivate 1343477 acres from the western rivers, in addition to all the rights of eastern river. India, to date, has utilized 6.75 MAF and will draw another 4.79 MAF from the system, to further reduce the flows at Kotri by that amount.
The 34.83 MAF flow to sea is in fact the mean discharge, and is bound to be lower by 10.0 to 14 MAF in any specific year.
The correct calculations in this respect will be:
Waste flows below Kotri Barrage = 34.84 MAF
Less
I. Additional allocations under Indus Water Accord 1991 = 9.35 MAF
ii. India’s flow in the Eastern Rivers = 6.97 MAF
iii. India additional water rights under the Indus Water Treaty = 4.79 MAF
iv. Yearly flow under Kotri barrage (lower by14 MAF than average) = 14.0 MAF
Net available flow below Kotri Barrage = - 0.27 MAF
Hence, the net available water to flow to the sea reduces to a negative balance, leaving nothing for storage into KBD. Therefore, the news of floods "wasting enormous amount of water" does not hold true
Still for people, who consider the flood water to be a mere waste do not realize that there is no mechanical method of removing millions of tons of deposited silt from the river beds of the barrages, and it is the force of water from these high floods that helps in washing away much of the accumulated silt.
References:
KBD; the Sindh Case by Kazi Abrar, 1998
Look before you leap by Abdul Majeed Kazi & A.N.G Abbassi
Geophysical and Geological Environment of Kalabagh DamTo fully comprehend the KBD impacts in the long run, its geophysical and geological environment along with the mechanics of water flow through soils needs to be understood in more detail.
In this respect, two important pointers appear in the topographic view of the proposed site of KBD i.e., the salt range and the location of the five oil fields nears the proposed dam site.
To be able to visualize the role of the salt range in the KBD’s feasibility, it is necessary to magnify and elaborate the section of the ground between the Murree thrust and Salt Range thrust.
Figure of Earth Crust under the Proposed Kalabagh Lake

Salt Range

KALABAGH LAKE

Thickness in Meters

Thrust
(Maximum Water Pressure of 70 Tones/sq.m)
Recent

S

Conglomerate, Coarse Stone, Clay, Sandstone
600 Miocene

A

Clay, Limestone, Sandstone, Coal

250 Tertiary

L

Sandstone, Argillites

130 Cretaceous

T

Limestone, Dolomites

200 Jurassic

Marl, Limestone, Fauna
300 Triassic

S

Argillites, Sandstone
20 Indeterminate

A

Glacial Conglomerates
200 Permian

L

Argil. Limestone
300 Carboniferous

T

Lime-Sandstone
300 Cambrian

Upper fold of the Salt Range Devolvement

PRE-CAMBRIAN BASEMENT

Location of the Dam on a Fault line
The proposed KBD site is situated in an area known to have fault lines and fractures.
The LANDSAT and SPOT imagery of the proposed KBD site indicates a right lateral fault known as Kalabagh Fault and another known as Kharjawan Fault, cutting the KBD site NE-SW between Indus and Kharjawan Nala on the Right Bank.
Geologically, the tectonic plates known as Pak Plate and the Asian Plate (Tibetan Plateau) are both greatly compressed and tectonically active.
It is a known fact that the compression and collision of moving earth plates cause mountains to rise, and the Himalayan and Karakoram Mountains continue to rise by a few millimeters each year due to the same compression. Such a phenomenon is bound to create instability in the area to a substantial degree, thereby making the dam structure prone to seismic damages in future.
Further it has also been observed that large dams induce earthquakes, because of their large water masses, and plays an important role in intensifying the impacts of small-scale earthquakes.
Thus the construction of Kalabagh Dam at the proposed location is to play with the dangerous consequences of earthquakes, and putting the life of downstream inhabitants at stake.

Design Drawbacks in KBD Project
Apart from the inherent planning drawbacks, the KBD also suffers from a variety of technical shortcomings. These vary from selecting a site, having the poorest capacity inflow ratio to that of proposing engineering designs making it the most unpredictable dam to operate.
Some of these aspects of the KBD are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs:
Site with Poor Capacity-Inflow Ratio
The selection of site for a dam and its hydraulic design depends on the capacity-inflow (CI) ratio, and a favorable CI ratio indicates a longer life of the reservoir.
For KBD, the capacity-inflow ratio is 6.1/90 = 0.07 i.e. 7% with respect to the live storage of the reservoir (for both the Indus and Soan limbs). Since Soan River is an Indirect limb of Indus, therefore the actual capacity inflow ratio for the main Indus stem would be 3.5/90= 0.04 = 4%, which is very poor, for the design of a storage dam.
Disastrous Sedimentation
Sedimentation and silting is a regular feature of irrigation structures, weirs and dams.
One of the most important contributions of Civil Engineering in this field has probably been the use of the energy of flowing water to maintain the balance of the system.
The science has been extensively researched, but is considered to be still in its empirical stage.
In this respect, Prof.G.G Stokes has contributed a scientific approach and has developed the famous "Stokes Law" to form the basic principle of sedimentation process. It says;
Vs = (3.3 g d (Ss-1)) 0.5
Where "Vs" is the Settling Velocity of the Particle, "Ss" is the Specific Gravity of the Particle
"G" is the Gravitational Pull and "d" is the Diameter of the Particle.
The "Stokes Law" suggests a relation between the Settling Velocity of Particles to their Diameter, while in suspension. And it states that, for a given specific gravity of particles and under a constant gravitational pull, the settling velocity will be directly proportional to the diameter of the particles. Which implies that, the courser particles will have a higher settling velocity than those of the smaller sizes?
The application of "Stokes Law" is found in the design of sedimentation tanks and in the study of sedimentation process in large dams.
As a confirmation of Stokes Law, it has generally been found that the courser particles, in suspension, get deposited earlier than the finer ones because of a higher settling velocity.
This phenomenon has been further confirmed by G.L Assawa in his excellent book; Irrigation Engineering (Published by Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1993, ) as "The courser sediment deposits farther away from the dam, while the finer sediment is deposited closer to the dam".
The applicability of this theory has been further confirmed in the case of Tarbela Dam, where a huge sediment mound has been developed, over the past twenty years, at a certain distance from the dam body.
The application of this law to our KBD case suggests that, the courser particles, in suspension of KBD waters, will have a higher settling velocity than those of the finer ones, and will hence deposit earlier than the finer particles. This suggests that the courser particles will start depositing at the farthest end of the reservoir, followed by next higher size and ultimately the finest in more close proximity to the dam body.
Therefore, within the present design parameters of KBD, it is feared that the sedimentation process will initiate near Nowshera City (the farthest end of the reservoir) and progress downwards, thereby putting the thickly populated towns to high flood risks from the very outset.
In addition, a major impact of the sedimentation process is Aggradations, which causes the bed level, and correspondingly flood levels, to rise to unforeseeable heights, causing heavy losses.
In this respect, G.L Assawa in his book; Irrigation Engineering (Wiley Eastern Ltd. Delhi, 1993), states:
"Where the sediment load in a River is in excess of the sediment transporting capacity, the excess sediment gets deposited in the river bed and the sediment load entering a given reach is greater than the sediment load leaving the reach during the same time. This causes a rise in the bed level (and hence the flood level) and decrease the bed slope with time. This phenomenon is known as Aggradations"
The high sediment load carried by River Indus has an important bearing on the design and operating rules of the KBD. This becomes more important, because a number of towns, upstream of Attock, are sensitive to the flood levels, feared to be aggravated with the increased sedimentation overtime.
In the case of Kalabagh Dam, the hydraulic drop will be far greater than that of Tarbela, or even Mangla, which will consequently accelerate the sedimentation process.
The siltation process at the reservoir of KBD is feared to be further accelerated due to the diminished velocity from water diversion into the Ghazi Barotha channel and the reduction in hundred Monsoon days in River Indus to fifty days.
On top of all this, the silt delta in Tarbela reservoir is traveling at a rate of ½ mile per year, and is feared to ultimately get deposited in the KBD reservoir, thus reducing the life span of the dam.
Silt Clearance Problems
The KBD is proposed to have an orifice spillway, 40-ft below the minimum water level of the reservoir. And is believed to work as the ultimate remedy for all the sedimentation problems.
A significant relation of sediment sluicing has been found with the occurrence of piping action under the foundations of the dam.
Its has been reported by K.R Sharma in his book; Irrigation Engineering (2nd edition, India Printers, Jullundar, 1949) that, the Aswan Dam on Nile, constructed on the strongest footings of granite stone, has been found to suffer from foundation damages with each sluicing operation (which discharge the silt at a mean 20 ft/sec velocity). And correspondingly, the sluicing operation consumes a major portion of the operation and maintenance budget of the dam.
Given the 40-ft lower orifice spillway to exclude the sediment of the reservoir, and the geological formations (discussed earlier), it is feared that the recurring sluicing operations would result into piping actions under the dam footing, thereby putting the stability of structure at stake.
Uncertain & Inefficient Mode of Operation
There is no established mode of reservoir operation to sluice the silt, and the recommended mechanism of lower draw down, longer sluicing period, and higher escapades will make the dam act more like a barrage, apart from wasting precious stored water.
In any case, the stored water in the reservoir will have to be emptied each year for the removal of the silt in May, which will be a significant loss of valuable stored water.
And during this process of emptying, sluicing and refilling (3 months approx.) operation, the power generation would be adversely affected, and would ultimately depend on the normal discharge of the river (after the live storage is exhausted), making the dam generate power on the run-off the river, or thermal systems.
Relation of KBD to Tarbela Dam
Originally planned, KBD was to be completed in 1996, and the designers assumed that significant quantities of sand would not be passed downstream of Tarbela Dam, therefore benefiting from its silt retention capability. However, due to the long delay and extensive sedimentation in Tarbela Dam, it is unlikely that any benefit will be derived of the position of Tarbela Dam.
On the other hand, the "Action Plan" suggested by Tarbela Sediment Management Consultants (TAMS), in their latest report of March 1998, to install a sediment sluicing system at Tarbela Dam, so as to recover its lost storage and extend its life by preserving its live storage, leaves little sense in constructing another silt trap to the sluiced sediment of Tarbela Dam.
Backwater Effect on Ghazi-Barotha Power Channel
Part of the River Indus waters have been diverted, at Ghazi (downstream of Tarbela), in the Ghazi-Barotha Power channel to generate cheap hydropower at Barotha power station. The 60,000 cusecs water passes through a 52 mile long concrete lined channel on the east of River Indus, and after passing through the power generating turbines, joins the same waters, upstream of proposed KBD site.
Since the KBD is supposed to store, and therefore head-up, the water into its tributaries. It is feared that the net fall at the hydropower station may be reduced in high floods, thereby reducing the power generation capacity.
Although, WAPDA claims to have studied the flood water reduction aspect of Ghazi-Barotha project on KBD, and found to be insignificant. Yet the backwater effects of KBD reservoir on the Ghazi-Barotha project itself have not been investigated. This becomes more important in the eventualities of highest possible flood levels, since a one-time backwater inundation of the power station may burn up the whole power station.
Unfeasible Right Bank Canal
The Right bank canal proposed was to have 10.5 miles long tunnels of 34.5 ft diameter, 8 mile long tunnels of 40 ft diameter, 4040 ft aqueduct on Kurram River, 12 drainage siphons and 42 drainage culverts, apart from its 80 miles regular length, for irrigating DI Khan, Bannu, Karak, Isa Khel and DG Khan areas. It was lately declared technically and economically unfeasible. With this, the last hopes of any possible benefit to NWFP were killed, thus leaving the dam to irrigate and earn royalty (on power generation) to Punjab only.
Short-term Impacts of Kalabagh Dam Project
The KBD is feared to cast its sinister shadows from its very first day of construction. They will vary from the dislocation of a large number of people and the submergence of their lands, houses and settlements, to the ultimate disappearance of long established cultures and ways of life. These are discussed as follows:
Population to be Displaced
There had been confusing figures about the number of people to be dislocated by KBD. WAPDA has been claiming a figure of 83000 persons, with 48500 belonging to Punjab and 38500 from NWFP. Whereas, independent observers claim a figure of more than 100,000 persons, to be the direct affectees of the dam.
In addition, there will be people indirectly dependent on the water of River Indus, like boatmen, herdsmen etc, who will loose their livelihood because of the KBD.
The investigation of the actual number of affectees is beyond the scope of this research; however, independent researchers have strongly questioned the reality of WAPDA’s figures, and consider them invalid.
The WAPDA’s figures do not include the thousands of people who would, it is feared, be displaced in the long run, due to the feared water-logging and salinity in Mardan, Charsadda and Nowshera Districts, and the Stalinization of sweet water aquifers in Karak and Lakki Districts.
Further, WAPDA’s claims of the provincial distribution of dislocated people from the two provinces of Punjab and NWFP, becomes more intriguing when one investigates the background of the proposed resettles. As the majority of people to be dislocated from their homelands in Punjab are Bangi-Khel and Saghari Khattaks and Isa-Khel Niazi´s, all from Pukhtoon tribes, like their brethren, settled in the Peshawar and adjoining valleys.
While it has been pleaded that the dislocated people will be adequately compensated, the fact that the resettlement of these thousands of people will generate acute intractable social, administrative and political problems has totally been overlooked.
It is worth mentioning that, a number of Tarbela resettles at Guddu Barrage command have long sold off their compensation land and are leading a rudderless life, because of their failure to settle down in an alien environment. Whereas many still remain without a shelter or compensation after two decades of the commissioning of Tarbela.
Area to be Submerged
There have been varying figures of the actual area to be submerged under the reservoir. WAPDA has been indicating the minimum possible figures, assuming provisional facility for one season cropping, and leaving the title with the landholders.
Whereas the calculation of the total area, expected to be submerged under the KBD waters is beyond the scope of this research. However, the point worth emphasizing is that the land to be affected by the KBD reservoir will not only be the one that gets submerged under the water, but will also be the one that gets inundated every five years (by 1 in 5 year flood).
In fact, it is not only the land area that will be snatched by the waters of KBD, but is the total area declared dangerous for safe development due to the increase in its risk factor for productive investment. And since flood plains are never regarded as safe boundaries for development, hence the actual land area to be affected by the KBD would be many times more than what is being claimed by KBD under its waters, as projected by WAPDA in its reports.
Moreover, and as a matter of great concern, the thousands of acres of rich cultivable land in Mardan, Charsadda and Nowshera Districts is feared to turn into swampy marshlands in the long run. Since the area has been fully developed with tremendous cost, its submergence will be a major loss to NWFP in particular and Pakistan in general.
At the same time, the creation of 164 sq. miles of water pond in the middle of a fully inhibited area will be a major and perpetual hazard for accidents to happen.
Long-term Impacts of Kalabagh Dam Project
Like its short-term impacts, KBD is going to have a long standing extremely injurious impact on the lives of the people both living in the immediate vicinity of project, as well as in the rest of the country.
The details of these impacts would vary in nature and in magnitude, and will appear in different moments of coming times to have devastating effects on the civilization of this whole region.
Some of the most important long-term impacts of the KBD are discussed below:
Increase in Surface Water Salinity
Water of the Indus River system carry a variety of salts that are left on the surface of irrigated land, while the irrigation water filters down or evaporates. To comprehend this, we need to understand the relation of irrigation water suitability to that of its salt contents.
Soil scientists believe that, when the contents of salt deposits increase to about 2.5%, the productivity of the land is visibly impaired and when it reaches a level of 7.0 %, no biological life is then possible in the soils.
The following table describes the categorization of the quality of water with the varying degree of salt content in the soils.
Water Classification
Total Dissolved Salts
Sodium
Concentration MEQ/L

EC x 10-5 25o C
PPM
%
Chlorides
Sulfates
Excellent (less than)
25
175
20
4
4
Good
25-75
175-525
20-40
4-7
4-7
Permissible
75-200
525-1400
40-60
7-12
7-12
Doubtful
200-300
1400-2100
60-80
12-20
12-20
Unsuitable (more than)
300
2100
80
20
20
Reference: Dr. Iqbal Ali; Irrigation Engineering, 1975
Some authors propose slightly lower permissible limits for chlorides than for sulphates, due to their more injurious characteristics.
To study the potential of Indus water to induce salinity, the following table from Dr. Nazir Ahmad’s research describes the salinity ratings at various points in Indus River:
Indus Water Salinity
Observation Point
Salinity gemstone
Difference
Ghaziabad
138
--
Attock
164
26
Kalabagh
216
52
DI Khan
226
10
DG Khan
242
16
Chechran
260
18
Reference: Dr.Nazir Ahmad, Groundwater Resources of Pakistan
From the above table, it can be observed that the quantum of salinity between Attock and Kalabagh (52 gemstone) is 100% more than between any other of the two (2) points observed in the analysis.
To visualize the effect of the use of saline water in irrigation systems, Saeed A. Rashid, in his excellent Treatise "KBD; A Scientific Analysis" has stated the problem in the following words
"If 10 inches of water carrying 200 PPM of dissolved salts leave behind 4.72 gm of solids per cubic foot and if 10 inches of such water is given to a piece of land and is allowed to soak and evaporate in the same pattern as is practiced in our canal irrigated agriculture, then 4.72 gm of salt will be deposited in each cubic foot of soil.
Given the salinity of water of River Indus at DI Khan of 226 PPM for every 3 soaking per year, or 30 inches of water, about 16 gm of salt will be added to each cubic foot. And in 30 years time, about 2.54% salts will be added to the top 8 inches of soil making the damage to crop field perceptible".
Saeed A. Rashid advances the interesting theory that, "perhaps that is the reason why the crop yield has started declining in the command areas of the canal system below DI Khan, 30 years after the commissioning of the barrage system when maximum coverage is achieved".
To study the effect of saline water’s use in the backdrop of KBD, it is revealed that, the billions of tons of the stored water in KBD is likely to exert tremendous pressure on alkali brine strata, which will then rise in vast sheets to mix with water of the reservoir and further increasing its saline content to unacceptable limits.
This water when used for irrigation purposes will play havoc with any soil that comes in contact with it through irrigation, or otherwise.
These observations indicate a very grave threat of destructive salinity to all agricultural lands below KBD site, if a dam were to be built at the proposed site, and its waters used for irrigation purposes. This needs to be further viewed into the purview of the already saline 24 million acres of irrigated land, out of our total of 34.5 million acres of irrigated land of Pakistan.
Flooding in Nowshera Valley
It has been repeatedly stated that the water for KBD will cause severe flooding in Nowshera valley, and has been constantly refuted by WAPDA through various tactics.
The flooding history of Nowshera describes the flood of 28th and 29th August, 1929, as having reached a maximum of 951-ft level above the mean sea level. The hydrologists have worked out the average return period of such a flood as 1 in 100 years.
A relatively lesser intensity of flood was experienced in 1978, which touched the heights of 945-ft above mean sea level. (Ref: Dr. Kennedy Report).
It is feared that, if the water level rises to the 1929 heights, or even the 1978 levels, it would be fairly high above the normal reservoir retention levels, thereby causing major destruction in the towns on the River Kabul banks, and overtopping the Kalabagh Dam itself.
To further aggravate the problem, the increased sedimentation overtime, may raise this height in River Kabul much further, and bring large-scale destruction in the surroundings.
To technically address the issue, the following monthly average flows of River Indus needs analysis:

Inflow at Indus (MAF)
Month
Low
High
Av.
April
2.49
5.59
4.00
May
5.74
9.00
7.99
June
14.68
19.00
15.46
July
15.01
24.94
21.96
August
18.23
23.39
20.96
September
6.24
17.92
9.58
October
2.30
7.01
3.51
November
1.47
3.65
2.15
December
1.20
2.42
1.86
January
1.25
1.99
1.77
February
1.20
1.82
1.65
March
1.94
3.37
2.36
Reference: Dr.Nazir Ahmad, Water Resources of Pakistan and their Utilization
Form the above table, it becomes evident that more than 65% of the annual water flow of Indus takes place between the months of June to September each year, when the snow melts in Himalayas and Karakoram Range combines with the monsoon season flows. And the remaining 35% flow is spread over the 8 months period from October to May.
Saeed A. Rashid, in his book "KBD; A Scientific Analysis", has analyzed the problem. He reveals that "Assuming a normal distribution, 68 percent of the times, high floods could bring an inflow of 27 MAF in July, showing the most possible probability of larger flows coming into the Indus River System. Only 4.6 percent of the times a flood could bring an inflow of 34.02 MAF, and there is 0.01 percent chance of a flood bringing in 46.06 MAF in the month of July.
As per the design parameters, the retention level of Water at KBD is just sufficient to contain the September inflow and the peaks are planned to be passed on, as it is.
Even if there is a capacity to contain a flood of 34 MAF, it will only flood the country upstream, instead of flooding downstream. Whereas the downstream river regime is better adjusted to handle large volumes. And there would be large-scale devastation in upstream habitat areas".
In the original design, WAPDA had provided for the construction of protective dykes around the major cities of Kabul River, so as to protect the water from over-spilling the banks of the river and destroying life and property. Which, upon the objections from NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa), had been eliminated with the reduction of 10-ft reservoir level, claiming to solve all the flooding problems?
Intriguingly, the revised designs show the dam height as the same El.940-ft above MSL, leaving a ridiculous 25-ft freeboard over the normal reservoir level, as against 5 to 7 ft common practice.
This raises the questions:
Why was the flooding danger ignored in the first instance?
How will the 10-ft reduction in reservoir level altogether avoid the 25-ft dykes at Nowshera?
Why has the dam level been maintained at the same 940-ft elevation, leaving the ridiculous looking 25-ft freeboard over the normal retention level?
Why has the WAPDA been overshadowing the sedimentation effect in Kabul River, feared to raise the bed level and exacerbate the flooding problem?
Why has the WAPDA been pleading the utility of Munda Dam in reducing the flooding problem at KBD, when the Munda Dam has only 0.37 MAF of flood storage, and can play only an insignificant role in reducing the extreme seriousness of floods at KBD?(Ref : PC-II for Feasibility Study of Munda Dam Project, March 1997, WAPDA)
Why has real model analysis of sedimentation behavior been avoided, so as to technically address the issue?
Drainage/Water-logging Problems in Nowshera
The raised water level in the River Kabul is feared to create excessive drainage problems in the area and lead to increasing and ruinous water logging.
In the originally designed dykes plan, it was provided to use sludge pumps to drain out any rain water accumulating behind the 25-ft dykes, and which was declared an impractical solution. In the revised scenario as well, no notice has been taken of the problem and little practical solutions identified for its remedy.
In addition, the raised water table in River Kabul will ultimately seep into the foundations of the buildings, both in and around Nowshera city, and render the old as well as new constructions habitat-risky. This effect will not only result in the desertification of the important Nowshera Cantonment, but also the historical villages lying on the banks of River Kabul.

Failure of Mardan/Swabi Scarps
Most of the NWFP human and material resources lie in Peshawar, Charsadda, Nowshera and Mardan and Swabi Districts, and the area is both culturally and economically the heart of the province. The land in these districts can be classified amongst the richest soils in the country and is the mainstay of agriculture in NWFP.
The fertility of these lands has further been ensured by the implementation of Mardan and Swabi Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP), with billions of rupees investment.
Incidentally, the outfalls of these Scarps discharge their effluents through two major drains i.e. The Hissara Drain and The Murdara Drain, into River Kabul.
Investigation of their outfall levels suggest that, they will probably continue functioning during the normal reservoir level of KBD (at 915-ft elevation), but will backflow once in every five years time (with the floods of 1 in 5 year), with disastrous circumstances.
WAPDA has admitted this phenomenon to occur for about 12 hours, with which the lands will be inundated in about one mile area, after which the waters will recede.
This is an irresponsible statement because the exact effects of such a regular occurrence, and in the eventuality of a 1 in 10 year flooding and a 1 in 100 year flooding, have not been forecasted by WAPDA, which will surely be much more than the 12 hours blockage of outfall drains claimed.
Therefore, the negative impacts of KBD will extend deep into the lands of Peshawar, Charsadda, Nowshera and Mardan districts, and will significantly reduce the productivity of these only cultivable lands of NWFP. The destruction of such valuable and scarce assets in a province with limited resources would have catastrophic repercussions on the life of the people of the province. And the people in the said districts will not be able to support life in their ancient habitats, and would be forced to migrate to other places.
Danger of Shallow Wells in Karak turning Brackish
As discussed earlier, the lateral permeability of soils in the vicinity of KBD is relatively higher than its vertical permeability, which translates into higher seepage from the dam.
Earlier in the Report, the increase in surface water salinity due to the salt dissolution, from the geological salt formations, has been explained at length in the above sections.
Hence, the fate of thousands of people living on the right bank of River Indus near KBD is feared to be under another threat due to the combined effect of these two soil characteristics.
In the Karak District, and its surroundings, the drinking water needs of the local population are fulfilled by shallow wells. Which provide the basic necessity of life through the storage of the surface water seepage into localized alluvial formation, forming the sweet water aquifer?
This shallow aquifer is distinctly separated from the deep-water reservoir of the saline zones, which is heavily polluted with salt concentrations. With the construction of KBD in the proposed geological environment, it is feared that this life giving sweet-water aquifer will be lost due to:
the lateral flow of saltish water into it and
Its vertical mixing with deep-water saltish reservoir.
With the result, the shallow water wells, presently used for water supply purposes of the people living in the Karak and its surrounding Districts, will turn brackish, thereby making life impossible in the area. And forcing the people to migrate to other places.
Effect on "KATCHO" in Sindh
During its voyage through Sindh, the River Indus inundates about 1.9 million acres of rich and fertile land, known as "Katcho", which averages about 5 miles in width for the whole 600 miles length. The "Katcho" contains 600,000 acres of thick riverine forests and about 1.3 million acres of rich grazing land, out of which about 600,000 acres is brought under plough to raise various cash crops.
The life at "Katcho" depends entirely upon the inundation of River Indus. And whenever, the flow reduces to an insufficient level, so as not been able to submerge this land, the crops, food and fodder are all affected and even wells for drinking water run low in all this area. This was experienced in the 1985-86 drought years, when the "Katcho" was not inundated, forcing many families to migrate to other areas for want of food and living.
It is feared that, with an unnatural storage on River Indus, the surface moisture in "Katcho" will be lost, resulting in soil degradation, salinity and wind erosion. The soil erosion causes decline in succession of plants, and it is feared that in "Katcho", the whole forest belt will become extinct in about 50 years time.
Such a devastation in "Katcho" will not only force the migration of directly dependant 100,000 inhabitants, but will also severely affect another 200,000 persons attached to the trade of the riverine forests.
Effect on Mangrove Forests in Sindh
In the Indus delta, about 650,000 acres of mangrove forest, the sixth largest in the world, lie dependent on the nutrients from the silt carried by the waters of River Indus. According to an IUCN paper of 1991 "The mangroves are the principle components of the delta ecosystem. Without them and the nutrients they recycle, and the protection they provide, the other components of ecosystem will not survive. Mangrove estuaries provide ideal nursery grounds for many commercial fish species, especially prawns".
Another IUCN report on the Korangi Ecosystem, 1991, state; "The other wildlife species supported by mangroves is porpoises, jackals, wild bears, reptiles, migratory fowl bids and three species of dolphins. If the mangrove habitat is destroyed, the continued existence in the Indus delta of all those will be threatened".
IUCN estimates the mangrove estuaries (like those of Indus delta) to be 4 to 5 times more productive than tropical estuaries without mangroves.
Apart from this, the Mangrove forests have the following advantages as well:
They provide timber resource for buildings and fuel wood for the vast population living in coastal areas.
They provide fodder and grazing land for cattle, goats, camels etc.
They provide opportunity to hatch 44 different species of fish in the delta area
They provide livelihood to 85000 fisherman
Like the "Katcho", the Mangrove forests totally depend on water in the River Indus, and with any reduction in the volume of sweet-water into their roots, they will dry up, resulting into the salt-water intrusion, and subsequent soil-erosion, over a short period of time.
Salt Water Intrusion in Sindh
The flow of water in River Indus effectively checks salt-water intrusion from the Arabian Sea into the flood plains of Indus. During the past few decades, as the storage and consumption of water has continued to increase in the northern plains, seawater has started flowing up in to Indus and its estuaries.
With the reverse flow of salt water into the southern part of Sindh, the sweet water aquifer gets contaminated, adding to the salinity of irrigated lands.
A symposium conducted by Pakistan National Institute of Oceanography and National Science Foundation in October 1982 at Karachi established that salt-water intrusion into the plains of lower Sindh is directly related to the decrease of flow in the River Indus.
To counter the problem, 10 MAF have tentatively been provided for in the Indus Water Accord 1991.
Until adequate water is released to Indus downstream of Kotri, it is feared that the seawater intrusion, combined with raised level of the Arabian Sea, will make Thatta, Badin and southern parts of Hyderabad District waterlogged marshlands.
Problem to Agriculture with Increased Seepage
The rate of aquifer recharge varies with the source and the composition of soil strata.
To develop a relation of the water seepage with the source, in the Indus Basin, HARZA has conducted a study in 1975, and its results are as under:

Indus Basin Aquifer Recharge

Post 1975 by Harza (MAF)
River Percolation
1.9
Canal Percolation
24.2
Water Courses
4.4
Fields
12
Rainfall
2.5
Total
46.3
These aquifer recharges for the water seepage are mainly due to the run-off water in the riverbed, the flow in canals and watercourses, sink age in the fields and rainfall.
From the above table, the relatively high value of seepage from the canal system is worth noting, since the enhanced water supply due to KBD is feared to further aggravate the aquifer recharge, and pose a major system and water management problem in future.
The relation of vertical and lateral permeability of local rocks in different canal command areas of Pakistan has already been discussed at length in the preceding section. And it was deduced that, there is a gradual decline in lateral permeability as we move downstream towards south.
Given the dangerously high values of lateral permeability in the vicinity of KBD site, the seepage from the reservoir is feared to become a major contributing factor to the aquifer recharge.
The situation becomes more precarious in the light of the dangerously high water table in the 2.4 million acres of irrigated agriculture, since a further push in the water table will render these land uncultivable by turning them into marshy swamp lands.
And the dam water, rather than increasing the irrigated agriculture area, will reduce the already commanded areas of Pakistan.
The Issue of Water Distribution as Replacement Water
In all its advocacy campaigns, WAPDA has been pleading the reasons of storage loss in Tarbela and Mangla dams, due to sedimentation. And has been, repeatedly emphasizing the need for additional water storage to compensate for the lost capacity in our existing system.
This statement becomes more important in the backdrop of the Indus Water Apportionment Accord 1991, water distribution formulas.
According to the Accord, the existing water resources of Pakistan, as of 1991, shall be distributed in the following proportions among the provinces:
Province
Percentage Share
Province
Percentage Share
Punjab
47.65 %
NWFP
7.5 %
Sindh
41.55 %
Baluchistan
3.3 %

In addition, another clause of the Accord stipulates the distribution of future water resources to be in the following ratio among the provinces:
Province
Percentage Share
Province
Percentage Share
Punjab
37 %
NWFP
14 %
Sindh
37 %
Baluchistan
12 %

The comparison of these two tables reveals that:
Province
Percentage Share in Existing Water Resources
Percentage Share in
Future Water Resources
Punjab
47.65 %
37 %
Sindh
41.55 %
37 %
NWFP
7.5 %
14 %
Baluchistan
3.3 %
12 %

Keeping these provisions of Indus Water Apportionment Accord in view, the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan will get more proportionate water out of the new water storages, as compared to what they are getting from the existing water storage. And correspondingly, the provinces of Punjab and Sindh will get less proportionate water out of the new water storages, as compared to what they are getting from the existing water storages.
Therefore, the WAPDA’s statements of considering the KBD storage as a compensation of lost storage of Tarbela and Mangla Dam will create another controversy of water distribution among the provinces. Because a decision on the consideration of KBD storage (if at all built) on whether to consider it as a new water storage or as a compensation of lost existing storage, will be required, so as to apply the requisite clause of Indus Water Accord for water distribution.
Operational Problems of Kalabagh Dam Project
The dam is designed for 28 weeks operation (or equivalent), but the model used for analyzing this aspect of the operation shows that the dam will not work efficiently for anything more than 21 weeks (or possibly less). This has been studied in detail by Saeed. A Rashed in his book "KBD, A Scientific Analysis", and the under-mentioned paragraphs from his work will try to summarize his findings.
Irrigation System Management Problems
An Indus Basin Model has been developed by the Development Research Center of World Bank in 1982, which stands as the only major optimization exercise for the Indus Basin Irrigation system, so far.
According to Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, the country’s water resources are divided into two major commands, the Mangla Command and the Tarbela Command. This classification does not include the NWFP canals above Kalabagh.
The Mangla Command includes the link canals and the canals originating from the upper reaches of eastern rivers. Whereas, the Tarbela command includes Thal, Haveli, Rangpur, Paharpur, Taunsa, Punjnad, Guddu, Sukkar and Kotri canals.
The following table gives the command wise withdrawals in MAF, for these two command areas.
Command wise Canal Withdrawals (MAF)

Year
Mangla Command
Tarbela Command

Kharif
Rabi
Total
Kharif
Rabi
Total
1980-81
19.27
11.98
31.25
48.48
24.74
73.22
1981-82
19.34
10.89
33.23
46.01
22.79
68.80
1982-83
18.80
11.62
30.42
46.82
23.19
70.01
1983-84
16.44
11.73
28.17
44.41
25.11
69.52
1984-85
19.70
10.88
30.58
44.54
23.59
67.93

1985-87
18.53
12.49
31.02
40.14
22.45
62.59
1986-88
18.81
12.76
31.57
46.70
24.85
71.55
1987-89
18.78
12.36
31.14
50.66
24.48
75.14
1988-89
18.55
10.74
29.29
46.42
26.77
73.19
1989-90
19.14
11.24
30.38
44.20
24.57
68.97
Reference: Saeed A. Rashed; KBD; A Scientific Analysis, 1995
It is a fact that the period of maturation for Rabi crops varies considerably from south to north, and the Rabi wheat matures in lower Sindh by end of February, while in north Punjab it matures by end April.
Given the crops’ requirements, any addition to the waters of Mangla Command for meeting the water shortages will be of no beneficial use, since the already optimized model of Indus Basin caters fully for the water requirements in these two command areas. And any random figure of water addition to the command water will only result in spoiling the balance of the optimized Indus Basin Model, and wastage of precious water.
In this respect, apart from bringing additional areas under the direct command of left bank KBD off-take, through the utilization of 0.78 MAF of water, the addition of 4.64 MAF water into Jehlum at Rasul Barrage will have no significant impact on our irrigation system management.
Therefore, the utility of a 15000 cusecs left bank canal from KBD will be nothing more than the provision of 0.78 MAF waters to its direct command and a little replenishment of Mangla storage’s in the Jehlum River command.
The Real Power Generation Potential of KBD Project
The need for electric power has been increasing at a tremendous rate. This is evident from the analysis of our annual power requirements, which shows that between 1985 to 1989, 12.5% more power was required each year, and the power consumption doubled every 4 years, before 1985. Presently, despite the economic recession of the last number of years, demand for electric power grows by an estimated 8.3% each year.
Presently, Pakistan produces 11869 Megawatts (MW) of electric power (6907 MW by thermal power generating units, 4825 MW by hydel and 137 MW by the Pakistan’s only nuclear power station at Karachi)
According to a World Bank study, the country will need up to 21267 MW electric powers by the year 2002, and between years 2002 to 2010, another 10358 MW will be needed, raising the total required generating capacity to 31265 MW.

The following data pertain to the large power generation units, both hydel and thermal, already in operation in 1992-93
Power Station
Units (kWh)
Generated Cost Paisa/kWh
Hydel

Tarbela
13955
7.34
Mangla
5780
4.35
Thermal

Pipri
5899
48.02
Jamshoro
4337
122.22
Kot Addu
3243
129.88
Guddu (5-10)
3877
4096
Guddu (1-4)
2742
62.51
Reference: Energy Yearbook 1993, KBD; the Sindh Case by Abrar Kazi
It can be observed that, the present cost of production of power, varies between hydel and thermal as 5.65 paisa per kWh to 72.12 paisa per kWh respectively, indicating that the hydel power is the most suitable source of cheap power generation.
However, there are certain disadvantages inherent in the hydel power systems because of their dependency on the waters to flow through the turbines.
From the above table, it can be observed that; the top three stations in terms of installed capacity are Tarbela, Pipri and Kot Addu, whereas the top three in terms of power output are Tarbela, Mangla and Pipri Power Station.
Further the Cost-wise, lowest are Mangla, Tarbela and Guddu (5-10), whereas Cost-wise, most expensive unit is Kot Addu Thermal Power Station. The total generation of the utility system was 48,156 GWH in 92-93, in which the share of Tarbela in the total generation was 28.98 % at 7.34 pa/kWh.
In the flood season (June to September) each year, hydel power peaks to the maximum, thereafter tapering off to insignificance in the winter months, generating less than 25% energy. Therefore the constant supply of energy from each hydel power unit will need an additional thermal unit for back up in the winter months, unless some method is used to maintain a constant flow of water into a hydel power dam.
The most important aspect of our present power generation system of the country is that, all the power stations are independent, in structure and in operation, which will not hold true for the relation of KBD to Tarbela. In which case, the water to the Power Station at KBD will first have to flow through Tarbela, to a very large extent. In fact the two power stations will work in tandem.
An interesting problem is to find out how the two reservoirs on the same river, will behave while generating power and supplying irrigation water to the downstream command areas.
The problem has been thoroughly studies by Saeed A. Rashid in his book; "KBD, A Scientific Analysis", through a mathematical model analysis (with the given installed capacity in the upper and lower reservoirs). Which makes the important revelation that, it is practically not possible to maintain generation capacity over a period of 8 weeks (appears to have been provided for by design of the project).
Even if high peaks are obtained in the IRS within the time period, it is not possible to avoid load shedding towards the end of December and beyond, in any year. And it is particularly important to note that the marked difference in behavior of the two reservoirs, when they will be working in tandem.
From the WAPDA’s calculations, it appears that the average inflow is about 92 MAF above Kalabagh, of which 70 MAF is utilized in Thal, Haveli, Rangpur, Sidhnai, Paharpur, Punjnad, Taunsa, Guddu, Sukkar and Kotri canals and other outlets of Tarbela Command.
Of the total inflow, 68 MAF (73%) occurs in June to September and by December the inflow is reduced to a trickle i.e. 1.86 MAF with which the power generation also is reduced to a minimum at Tarbela.
When the level in the upper and lower reservoir drops to the same point for power generation, it is not possible either to distribute more irrigation water or to generate more power. And by that time, the country has to revert to thermal power, unless there are some run-of-the-river type power generation arrangements.
Therefore, to get additional power at a lower cost for ensuring reliability and protection against drop in pressure, it would be necessary to get out of the "water cycle". And the conjunctive operation of KBD and Tarbela Dam will be of not much help in providing cheap hydropower, because of their inter-dependence for water releases.
Flood Regulation Risks
It has been discussed earlier that the possibility of sedimentation and flood regulation cannot be left at the mercy of WAPDA’s mathematical model analysis, because of the assumptions and constraints involved in the solution of complex mathematical equations, making the solutions questionable in real life.
This becomes more important with the limitation of present knowledge on sediment transport. And, in the absence of concrete evidence on the behavior of sediment load, carried by River Indus and River Kabul, the mathematical solutions of obsolete silt carriage figures cannot be trusted for KBD’s case.
Since the sedimentation science has an important bearing on the behavior of floods, along with the unpredictable nature of hydrology to predict the occurrence of floods, the operational model of KBD to discharge the early floods at the 890-ft level in the early days of monsoon becomes questionable. With WAPDA having no divine power to predict the non-occurrence of any floods in the later days of monsoon, by which time the reservoir will be ulmost full i.e. by the end of August, the whole exercise of mathematical modeling will be left as a futile exercise, resulting into large-scale devastation, particularly in the initial reaches of KBD reservoir.
Further, the present state of development on the banks of River Kabul (virtually into the Riverbed), and its continued expansion towards the River (in the absence of any building control), restricts the waterway. This will, naturally, enhance the possibility of raising the height of floodwaters to unimaginable levels, resulting into much more disastrous impacts then ever perceived by WAPDA’s engineers, thus increasing the damage to property and life.
It is also worth mentioning that the downstream regimes have adopted themselves to the high flood waters of the last so many years, as the flood water has carved its way out in the river bed of the flatter reaches of Punjab and Sindh. In contrast, the upstream reaches of River Kabul i.e. areas around Nowshera, Akora Khattak Jehangira, and Attock are new to the phenomenon of floods, because of their lesser eventuality, and they will take years to adopt to the high flows, may be by drowning the aforementioned towns.

Economic Impact Analysis of KBD
Economic Impact on Various Provinces of Pakistan
Economic Evaluation of Kalabagh Dam
To assess its Impacts on Individual Provinces
It is being pleaded by the Government that, the Kalabagh Dam is the sole savior of Pakistan’s economic system, and is the only path left to put the country back on the real path to development.
This, it is said, will be achieved by bringing more area under irrigation to produce food, and generating cheap hydel power to keep the industrial machinery running at economical cost. In addition, it is pleaded that the high cost of damages due to floods will be reduced (eliminated) by constructing the Dam at Kalabagh.
The determination of KBD’s potential to eliminate the flood-damages requires little investigation, since it has already been discussed at length in the technical section of this report, and it has been deduced that the net impact may even be to exacerbate the losses because of upstream flooding probability and because of the no flood-storage provision in the reservoir or in the operating schedule of the dam.
The economic impact of KBD in bringing more area under irrigation and meeting the power needs of the country requires an analysis, in the purview of the present irrigation and power system of Pakistan, so as to assess the possible distribution of economic benefits among the various federating units of Pakistan, and for an indication of the net beneficial impact on the people living in various parts of the country.
At this stage, a clarification on the true meaning of the word "development" would not be out of place, since it has often been confused with the implementation of certain high profile projects or with the provision of certain basic facilities to the people.
According to Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq "the purpose of development is not just to enlarge incomes, but to enlarge people’s choices, and that these choices extend to a decent education, good health, political freedom, cultural identity, personal security, community participation, environmental security, and many other areas of human well being".
Also "economic growth does not automatically translate into human development; a link between growth and human lives must be created through conscious national policies".
Another school of thought portrays the ultimate objective of development as the equitable distribution of income (resources) among the people, which is commonly represented by the Gini-Coefficient, indicating the relative distribution of resources among the various income groups.
According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan 1996-97, the situation has deteriorated in Pakistan, since the Gini-Coefficient has increased from 0.386 to 0.410 in the period of 1962-63 to 1992-93.
Thus, the establishment of a number of industrial units by a group of millionaires, the construction of a motorway or the up gradation of an airport terminal to a most modern one does not necessarily mean the country getting developed.
Similarly, the provision of phone booths at street level or the villages’ are getting connected to the national electricity grid does not entitled the country to be called as a developed nation.
Therefore, the objective of Pakistan’s developmental policies should not only be to increase the choices of its people towards the basic necessities of life, but to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits among its people, living in its different parts. And it will be this premise of development that will be analyzed in the following paragraphs, to check the suitability of KBD in increasing the people’s choices of the various parts of the country, in an equitable proportion.
Irrigation Water Utilization
The irrigation system plays an important role in ensuring the continued supply of the basic necessity of human life; the food, since the agriculture system cannot survive without the timely application of irrigation water to produce food grain.
Pakistan is fortunate to have an extensive irrigation network, which commands a large area to produce food for its people and cotton for export to earn precious foreign exchange.
The Kalabagh Dam will surely enhance the limits of this network and bring additional land under the command. However, it is also feared to negatively affect a good enough proportion of land through seepage’s and surface salinity, and which has been discussed at length in the technical part of this report.
To estimate the positive impact of KBD in achieving the ultimate development objective, we will analyze the irrigation enhancement capability of KBD in the purview of our aforementioned definition of "development".
In this respect, a closer analysis of the irrigation network of Pakistan and its distribution in the various divisions of the country is discussed below.
Province-wise distribution of actual Cultural, Canal Command and Canal Irrigated Areas
Province
Total Cultivable Area (Million Acres)
Canal Command Area (Million Acres)
Actual Canal Irrigated Area (MA)
Punjab
36.4
19.5
16.41
Sindh
24.5
12.2
10.0
NWFP
7.6
1.8
1.32
Baluchistan
15.5
1.0
0.94

84
34.5
28.67
The true meaning of above figures will become more evident when they are viewed in their respective percentages. These are shown below:
Province-wise percentage distribution of Cultural, Canal Command and Canal Irrigated Areas
Province
Total Cultivable Area (% of total)
Canal Command Area
(% of the province’s cultivable area)
Actual Canal Irrigated Area
(% of the province’s cultivable area)
Punjab
43 %
55 %
45 %
Sindh
30 %
50 %
41 %
NWFP
9 %
24 %
17 %
Baluchistan
18 %
6 %
6 %
A further closer view will be achieved when the above figures are viewed in the purview of the total available geographical areas of the different provinces. Which are as mentioned below?
Province
Area
(as % of total area of Pakistan)
Punjab
25.6 %
Sindh
17.7 %
NWFP (inc. FATA)
12.8 %
Baluchistan
43.6 %
Considering the land area to be the common denominator for comparison, it is observed that:
I. Punjab, comprising 25.6 % of the total country’s area, contributes 43% to the total cultivable area figure of Pakistan;
ii. The Province of Sindh, comprising 17.7 % of the total country’s area, contributes 30 % to the total cultivable area figure of Pakistan;
iii. NWFP, comprising 12.8 % of the total country’s area, contributes 9 % to the total cultivable area figure of Pakistan;
iv. Baluchistan, the largest province making 43.6 % of the total land area of Pakistan, can only boast of contributing 18 % to the total cultivable area figure of the country.
The above evaluation clearly indicates the relative importance of Punjab and Sindh, to work as the food (and cotton export) machine for the whole of Pakistan, because of their major share in the total cultivable area of the country, with Punjab claiming 43%, followed by Sindh contributing 30% of the total cultivable area of the country.
However, the second column of the above table presents the relative distortion in the relative Canal Command Areas of the various provinces. Which depicts that?
I. for Punjab, 55% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command;
ii. For Sindh, 50% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command;
ii. For NWFP, 24% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command;
ii. For Baluchistan, 6% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command.
Whereas, part of this huge disproportion can be blamed on the particular landscape of NWFP and Baluchistan, the difference is too big to be overlooked. And, it can very well be attributed to the lack of suitable infrastructure, such as canals for carrying the irrigation water to the available cultivable areas or installation of tube wells to explore the groundwater table, for bringing the neglected provinces at par with the other ones.
The availability (or lack of it) of suitable canal infrastructure for bringing the cultivable areas under canal irrigation can further be observed from the third column of the above table. Which shows that?
I. 45 % of the total cultivable area of Punjab is under canal irrigation
ii. 41 % of the total cultivable area of Sindh is under canal irrigation
iii. 17 % of the total cultivable area of NWFP is under canal irrigation
iv. 6 % of the total cultivable area of Baluchistan is under canal irrigation
Whereas, the above illustration indicates the relative importance of constructing more canals for bringing the additional canal command area under irrigation, i.e. 10% in Punjab, 9% in Sindh and 7% in NWFP, the important aspect will be to evaluate their overall economic impact in the various provinces with respect to each other, due to the concentration of overall benefits in one or more provinces of the country, with expenditure common resources of all the four federating units.
In the above tables, the relative percentages of canal command (or canal irrigated) areas to the available cultivable areas work as an eye opener to reveal the story of negligible investment, over the years, in NWFP and Baluchistan in developing 17 % and 6% of the available cultivable area respectively, as compared to the Punjab and Sindh Provinces where the same has been developed to the tune of 45% and 41%.
Thus for producing more food for the growing population, with an equitable distribution of resources out of the common kitty, the first priority should be to utilize the available 94 % cultivable area of Baluchistan and 83 % cultivable area of NWFP, through canal or tube well irrigation, rather than pumping more resources into a project that will increase the canal command areas of Punjab and Sindh, resultantly acting to further concentrate the benefits in these areas.
The anomaly in distribution of basic agricultural inputs can further be observed from the water distribution of "Water Apportionment Accord 1991". Which says that?
1. Distribution of existing water resources among the provinces will be as follows:
Province
Water Share
(% of total)
Punjab
47.6 %
Sindh
41.6 %
NWFP (inc. FATA)
7.5 %
Baluchistan
3.3 %
2. Distribution of future water resources among the provinces will be as follows:
Province
Water Share
(% of total)
Punjab
37 %
Sindh
37 %
NWFP (inc. FATA)
14 %
Baluchistan
12 %
An analysis of these figures in the backdrop of the total geographical areas and the total cultivable land areas of the provinces reveal that:
I. Punjab, for a geographical area of 25.6 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 43 % of the total, gets 47.6 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 37 % of the future water resources
ii. Sindh, for a geographical area of 17.7 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 30 % of the total, gets 41.6 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 37 % of the future water resources
iii. NWFP, for a geographical area of 12.8 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 9 % of the total, gets only 7.5 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 14 % of the future water resources
iv. Baluchistan, for a geographical area of 43.6 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 18 % of the total, gets only 3.3 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 12 % of the future water resources
This distribution of the major agricultural input, water, is anything but disproportionate from every angle and will only act to push one province against the other in the long run. Therefore, the need of the hour is to identify the priority development areas from the point of view of an equitable distribution of resources so as to equally benefit all the residents of the country.
Electric Power Utilization
Before venturing into the economic evaluation of KBD on the various provinces due to the electric power benefits, it is required to study the present pattern of electricity consumers and electricity utilization in the four Provinces.
In this respect, the following tables from the WAPDA’s statistical data will work as a basis of our analysis.
Category-wise Number of Consumers (as on 30-09-1997)

Total Connections
AEB
Domestic
Commercial
Industrial
Agricultural
Others

Lahore
1296619
273681
43453
31849
1380
1646983
17%
Gujranwala
866083
122796
25310
22828
212
1037230
10%
Faisalabad
1233692
182384
32311
22824
851
1472063
15%
Islamabad
1303539
196848
15592
11232
1094
1528306
15%
Multan
1363296
207618
26295
29614
919
1627743
16%

Punjab
6063229
983327
142961
118347
4456
7312324
73%
Peshawar (NWFP)
1322097
181194
21605
21470
1258
1547625
16%
Hyderabad (Sindh)
661487
153697
18398
17446
1386
852414
9%
Quetta (Baluchistan)
189224
47391
2135
11410
247
250407
3%
Pakistan
8236037
1365609
185099
168673
2826
9962771
100%
Ref : Power Distribution Progress Report for October 1997 by Statistics Directorate WAPDA

Electricity Consumption (1992-93)

million kWh
as % of total
Punjab
21879
58.89%
NWFP (inc. FATA)
4688
12.62%
Sindh
9220
24.82%
Baluchistan
1365
3.67%

Pakistan (total)
37152

Analysis of the above tables reveals the following percentages of category-wise electricity consumers, and total electricity consumption in various provinces of Pakistan:
Electricity Consumers and Power Utilization in Various Provinces
%age as of total
Province
Total Number of Consumers
Total Power Supply

Punjab
73 %
65 %
NWFP
16 %
16 %
Sindh
9 %
11 %
Baluchistan
3 %
4 %
Ref: WAPDA Statistics Division Report
Percentage of Prominent Consumers in various Provinces
%age as of total
Province
Domestic Consumers
Commercial
Consumers
Industrial Consumers
Agricultural
Consumers

Punjab
74 %
72 %
77 %
70 %
NWFP
16 %
13 %
12 %
13 %
Sindh
8 %
11 %
10 %
10 %
Baluchistan
2 %
3 %
1 %
7 %
Ref: WAPDA Statistics Division Report

From a closer look of the above tables, it is observed that:
1. Punjab has a total number of consumers, which are:
- 4.56 times that of NWFP
- 8.12 times that of Sindh, and
- 24.34 times that of Baluchistan

2. The composition of Electricity Consumers in Pakistan reveals that, Punjab has the following category of consumers in the under-mentioned proportion:
a. Domestic Consumers
- 4.62 times that of NWFP
- 9.25 times that of Sindh, and
- 37 times that of Baluchistan
b. Commercial Consumers
- 5.53 times that of NWFP
- 6.54 times that of Sindh, and
- 24 times that of Baluchistan

c. Industrial Consumers
- 6.41 times that of NWFP
- 7.7 times that of Sindh, and
- 77 times that of Baluchistan
d. Agricultural Consumers
- 5.38 times that of NWFP
- 7 times that of Sindh, and
- 10 times that of Baluchistan
3. Punjab utilizes electricity, which is:
- 4.06 times that of NWFP
- 5.9 times that of Sindh, and
- 16.25 times that of Baluchistan
To develop a common basis of comparison, the analysis of these figures is required to be viewed in purview of the area and population of the various provinces. Which are as follows?

Percentage Area & Population of the Various Provinces
Province
Area
as % of total

Province
Population
as % of total
(as per 1981 census)
Punjab
25.6 %

Punjab
55.6 %
NWFP (inc. FATA)
12.8 %

NWFP(inc. FATA)
15.7 %
Sindh
17.7 %

Sindh
22.6 %
Baluchistan
43.6 %

Baluchistan
5.1 %
Ref: NWFP Development Statistics 1995 & 1996
From a closer look of the above table, it is revealed that:
Punjab has a total area, which is :
- 2 times that of NWFP
- 1.45 times that of Sindh, and
- 60% of Baluchistan

Punjab has a total population, which is :
- 3.54 times that of NWFP
- 2.46 times that of Sindh, and
- 10.9 times that of Baluchistan
A Comparison of this table with the previous figures suggests that:
For an area of Punjab, which is
- 2 times that of NWFP
- 1.45 times that of Sindh, and
- 60% of Baluchistan

and a population, which is :
- 3.54 times that of NWFP
- 2.46 times that of Sindh, and
- 10.9 times that of Baluchistan
Punjab has a total number of consumers, which are :
- 4.56 times that of NWFP
- 8.12 times that of Sindh, and
- 24.34 times that of Baluchistan

Punjab utilizes electricity, which is :
- 4.06 times that of NWFP
- 5.9 times that of Sindh, and
- 16.25 times that of Baluchistan
Thus for any investment into the power sector, out of the common resources, the Punjab Province will benefit in an advantageous manner due to the comparatively wider network of consumers and greater use of electricity.
This could be studied further under two possible perspectives:
1. Considering the land to be the common denominator between the Provinces
The additional power benefits will distribute as follows:
a. Number of consumers benefited
- 2.28 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of NWFP
- 5.6 times of consumers in Punjab as that of Sindh
- 40.46 times of consumers in Punjab as that of Baluchistan
b. Electricity utilized
- 2 times in Punjab as that of NWFP
- 4 times in Punjab as that of Sindh
- 27 times in Punjab as that of Baluchistan

2. Considering the population as the common denominator between the Provinces
The additional power benefits will distribute in the following manner:
a. Number of consumers benefited
- 1.29 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of NWFP
- 3.3 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of Sindh
- 2.24 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of Baluchistan
b. Electricity utilized
- 1.15 times in Punjab as that of NWFP
- 2.4 times in Punjab as that of Sindh
- 1.5 times in Punjab as that of Baluchistan
Going back to the table of consumer analysis in various provinces we observe that:
From every single rupee investment in Power Sector of Pakistan
I. For Punjab Vs NWFP
- 4.62 Domestic Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP
- 5.53 Commercial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP
- 6.41 Industrial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP
- 5.38 Agricultural Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP
II. for Punjab Vs Sindh
- 9.25 Domestic Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh
- 6.54 Commercial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh
- 7.7 Industrial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh
- 7.0 Agricultural Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh
III. for Punjab Vs Baluchistan
- 37 Domestic Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan
- 24 Commercial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan
- 77 Industrial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan
- 10 Agricultural Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan
To analyze the impact of above distortions on the economic development of the various provinces with respect to Punjab, we can derive some interesting & revealing impacts.
If we assume that, the domestic consumers’ electricity use is solely for non-productive purposes, and the commercial, industrial and agricultural electricity consumers utilize the electric power for economic development, we arrive at:
I. Economically Productive Consumers in Punjab are, on the average, 5.77 times that of NWFP
I. Economically Productive Consumers in Punjab are, on the average, 7.1 times that of Sindh
I. Economically Productive Consumers in Punjab are, on the average, 37 times that of NWFP
Thus any developmental activity in the power sector will push Punjab up, 5.77 times that of NWFP, 7.1 times that of Sindh and 37 times that of Baluchistan, in the economically productive sectors.
In view of this, the power generated at Kalabagh Dam will act to make the Province of Punjab, and its people, develop further and the other three provinces getting progressively dependent on it for employment and basic necessities of life.
In addition, the people of the other three provinces will also be discredited for their basic right to an equal opportunity to facilities and opportunities created out of the common resources.
Therefore, for a balanced development in future, the disparities in power consumption should first be eliminated before any more investment, out of the common kitty, that makes the rich richer and further develops the comparatively developed province at the cost of under-developed provinces of the country.
Conclusion
Based on the above technical drawbacks, the project is expected to get the most intense reaction from population to be affected, and disrupt the piece and tranquility of the entire country.
Sane considerations therefore demand that KBD should be dropped in the face of better alternatives.

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Monday, January 21, 2008

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Kalabagh Dam -- Development or disaster?

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